

Political Leadership in a Democratic Polity: A Case Study of Quetta

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Abstract:

This research paper examines the nature and effectiveness of political leadership in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province in Pakistan, within the framework of a democratic polity. Using a qualitative research methodology based on secondary data, the study explores the dynamics of political leadership, governance challenges, and the impact of leadership on democratic consolidation in Quetta. The paper draws on existing literature, government reports, policy documents, and media analyses to assess how political leaders navigate ethnic diversity, security concerns, and socio-economic development. The findings suggest that while democratic institutions exist, leadership in Quetta faces significant challenges due to political fragmentation, weak governance, and external influences. The study concludes with recommendations for strengthening democratic leadership in the region.

Keywords: Political leadership, Democracy, Quetta, Balochistan, Governance, Qualitative Research

1. Introduction

Democratic governance relies heavily on effective political leadership to mediate conflicts, ensure inclusive representation, and foster sustainable development (Givens, 2008) (Robinson, 2012). Across the world, from established democracies like the United States and

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Germany to fragile states like Iraq and Afghanistan, the quality of political leadership determines the stability and functionality of democratic institutions (North, 1990); (Fukuyama, 2014). In Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Balochistan province, political leadership operates within a complex framework marked by ethnic diversity (Pashtun, Baloch, Hazara, and others), geopolitical significance, and a history of conflict and militarization (Siddiqi, 2022).

Quetta's political landscape shares similarities with other multi-ethnic, conflict-affected regions such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Kashmir, where leadership must navigate deep-seated divisions while maintaining democratic legitimacy (Lijphart, 2004); (Varshney, 2003). Unlike more established democracies, Quetta grapples with persistent instability due to insurgency and militant activity, mirroring challenges seen in Colombia and the Philippines, where non-state armed groups undermine governance (Kalyvas, 2006). The city also suffers from weak institutional capacity, a struggle shared by many post-colonial states like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where bureaucratic inefficiencies weaken policy implementation (Herbst, 2004). Compounding these issues is external interference, as geopolitical rivalries, similar to those affecting Ukraine and Syria, shape local leadership, particularly given the complex interplay between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan (Drezner, 2014).

This research highlights as many as three very pivotal areas of investigations of political reality of the region. Firstly, the study in hand emphasizes on tremendous challenges faced by leaders in Quetta region which have higher level of resemblance to similar threats being recorded in both Baghdad and Kabul (Mansfield, 2005). In case of Quetta, such obstacles are posed by the ethnic divisions and growing security mishaps to say the least. Secondly, it focusses on the leadership dimension by analyzing the operation mechanism within the centralized federal structure of Pakistan and, at the same time, differentiating it with the predominantly decentralized governance model of India (Chhibber, 2018). Meanwhile, political leaders within the capital territory of Balochistan are massively constrained by the centralization of authority as they hardly get opportunity to raising local matters. Finally, the research goes on to evaluate the tremendous potential for more transformative leadership in Quetta by drawing lessons from post-apartheid South African experience with inclusive governance (Mandela, 2008), while, at the same time, acknowledging the continuous elite capture by undermining democratic progress in the region.

This study makes an attempt to contribute to the discussion on democratic governance in divided societies through generating a

scholarly debate on Quetta's political leadership by analyzing it through comparative lenses. The findings, however, offer valuable insights into the interplay between conflict resolution, institutional design, and political representation in contexts marked by ethnic diversity as well as security challenges. The research, on one hand, enriches our understanding of Quetta's specific political dynamics, on the other, it develops key theoretical debates about democratic leadership in similarly complex environment.

The research explores how democratic leadership functions having ethnically diverse and politically instable region, Quetta, within the comparative political paradigm. Using qualitative analysis of secondary sources such as peer-reviewed journals, government publications and media reports the study attempts to investigate the changing dynamics of political leadership in Quetta.

2. Literature Review: Post-Colonial and Institutional Perspectives on Political Leadership in Quetta

2.1. Introduction to Theoretical Frameworks

Political leadership in conflict-affected regions like Quetta cannot be understood without examining the historical and institutional contexts that shape governance. This literature review synthesizes two critical theoretical lenses, post-colonialism **and** institutionalism, to analyze how colonial legacies and structural weaknesses constrain democratic leadership in Quetta. By engaging with seminal works from Mahmood Mamdani, Douglass North, Partha Chatterjee, and James Mahoney, this section establishes a foundation for understanding Quetta's political dynamics in comparative perspective.

2.2. Post-Colonialism and the Legacy of British Rule

2.2.1 Colonial Construction of Ethnic Hierarchy

British colonial rule (1839-1947) was an attempt to maximize the social distress in Balochistan by formulating policies that encouraged division within the society. It was the notorious strategy of "divide and rule" being applied by the British by placing the Pashtuns as a "martial race" with easy access to government jobs and the military (Jalal A. , 2014). Similarly, Baloch were mistreated by imposing hand-picked tribal leaders making way for indirect (Ahmed Z. S., 2024). In the case of Hazaras, sectarian tensions were fueled, denying them due political rights and pushing them to the margins (Ibrahimi, 2017). These colonial manipulations didn't just create inequality, they planted the seeds of lasting discord, structuring Balochistan's ethnic relations into a rigid hierarchy that still shapes power struggles today. These colonial-era classifications continue to influence Quetta's politics, where ethnic

parties (e.g., Balochistan National Party, Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party) mobilize support along communal lines (Siddiqi, 2022).

2.2.2 The Post-Colonial State and Neo-Colonial Exploitation

After Pakistan gained independence in 1947, Quetta's administrative systems remained deeply rooted in British colonial frameworks. Drawing on Achille Mbembe's (Mbembe, 2001) concept of the "postcolony," we see how colonial-era laws, such as the oppressive Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), were retained to justify military control over civilian governance (Khalid, 2019). Rather than dismantling these structures, the new state repurposed them, ensuring that authoritarian governance persisted under a different banner. This continuity highlights how post-colonial states often replicate the very systems they were supposed to overthrow.

Despite political independence, Quetta's economy remained structured around extraction, with local resources like natural gas and minerals being siphoned off by federal authorities and a new class of elites (Baloch, 2022). This mirrors broader patterns of neo-colonialism, where external and domestic powers sustain economic dependency. The arrival of international projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) further entrenched this dynamic, as foreign investments often prioritized external interests over local development (Zaidi, 2019). Such exploitation reinforces the argument that formal independence does not always translate to true economic sovereignty.

Similar patterns of control appear in Indian-administered Kashmir, where post-1947 governance has echoed British colonial strategies. Scholars like Bose (Bose, 2005) note how India employs military dominance, legal exceptionalism, and resource extraction, tactics once used by the British, to suppress Kashmiri autonomy movements. This comparison underscores a grim reality: many post-colonial states, rather than breaking free from imperial legacies, have repurposed them to maintain dominance over marginalized regions. The cases of Quetta and Kashmir reveal how colonial logic persists, merely adapting to new political actors.

2.3. Institutional Analysis of Governance Weaknesses

2.3.1 Formal Institutional Failures

Douglass North's (North, 1990) institutional theory helps explain how Pakistan's flawed formal structures perpetuate ineffective governance. The 18th Amendment (2010), while intended to empower provinces, left critical fiscal policies ambiguous, fueling constant federal-provincial disputes (Waseem, 2020). This legal vagueness creates a leadership vacuum where neither tier of government takes full responsibility, leading to policy paralysis. Similarly, judicial backlogs,

like the staggering 32,000 pending cases in Balochistan's courts, destroy public trust in justice, as delays render the legal system ineffective (PILDAT, 2022). When institutions fail to deliver, citizens lose faith in the state's ability to govern fairly.

Pakistan's electoral system further entrenches institutional weaknesses by over-representing rural areas, a colonial-era relic that skews power toward tribal elites (Wilder, 1999). This imbalance allows a small, entrenched class to dominate policymaking, sidelining urban and marginalized voices. The result? Laws and budgets favor landlords and tribal leaders rather than addressing broader public needs. Such distortions reveal how weak formal institutions, whether in constitutions, courts, or elections, reinforce inequality instead of fostering equitable development. Without structural reforms, governance will remain trapped in cycles of inefficiency

2.3.2 The Power of Informal Institutions

In Pakistan's governance landscape, informal institutions often wield more influence than official ones. As Helmke & Levitsky (Helmke, 2006) argue, the voids left by the existing unwritten rules are often filled by strong informal systems. Take for instance the jirga justice, also commonly known as tribal councils which regulate and resolve almost 78% of local disputes (Gazdar, 2004), this is because of the fact that majority citizens view state courts as either inaccessible or highly corrupt. At the same time, the Deobandi madrassas, according to Andrabi, have provided the community with both social services as well as pivotal education in peripheries by creating a parallel welfare system (Andrabi, 2006). These glaring examples highlight the loopholes left by the state (Formal) institutions in providing fundamental services including justice.

According to famous Pakistani scholar Ayesha Siddiqa, a "parallel government" is operated by powerful military establishment through intelligence agencies such as Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) by influencing policymaking clearly bypassing the elected representatives (Siddiqa, 2019). Moreover, informal military network exercise real de facto powers instead of democratic institutions as shadow governance system engulfs the entire state by undermining the civilian authority.

2.3.3 Path Dependence and Locked-In Underdevelopment

The concept of path dependence by James Mahoney's (Mahoney, 2000) sums up why Quetta remains marginalized and underdeveloped simply because the colonial outdated and irrelevant policies still rule over the region despite of the fact that the British Raj had ended in 1947. However, what is evident today in this part of the country is the

crumbling infrastructure of railways and roads (Ahmed M. , 2022). The status of education is not satisfactory either, with literacy rates frozen at 43%, barely improved since Partition (PSLM, 2021). Even modern projects like the (flagship project) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) prioritizing resource extraction over local development by repeating history- old colonial economic enclaves rather than fostering inclusive growth (Ali, 2019). These entrenched patterns clearly highlight how historical institutional choices continue to restrain progress, leaving Quetta struggling under the weight of its bitter past.

2.4. Comparative Perspectives: Lessons from Other Divided Cities

City	Colonial Legacy	Post-Colonial Challenges	Relevance to Quetta
Belfast	British sectarian divide (Catholic/Protestant)	Power-sharing after Good Friday Agreement (1998)	Shows consociationalism's potential and pitfalls
Jerusalem	British Mandate's ethnic zoning	Ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict	Demonstrates how external interference perpetuates instability
Kinshasa	Belgian extractive colonialism	Elite capture of mineral wealth	Parallels Balochistan's resource curse

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This study adopts a qualitative research design to analyze political leadership in Quetta through secondary data analysis. Given the sensitive nature of fieldwork in conflict-affected regions, reliance on existing scholarly works, policy reports, and media documentation provides a viable alternative for robust analysis (Bryman, 2016). The methodology is structured around:

- **Thematic Analysis** of secondary sources to identify patterns in leadership dynamics.
- **Comparative Case Study** approach to contextualize Quetta within global post-colonial cities.
- **Critical Discourse Analysis** of policy documents to assess institutional constraints.

3.2 Data Collection: Secondary Sources

3.2.1 Academic Literature

The academic literature draws on peer-reviewed analyses of Pakistan's ethnic politics and militarization (Siddiq, 2019); (Rafiq, 2022), framed through post-colonial and institutionalist theories (Mamdani, 1996; North, 1990), while comparative urban studies examine divided cities like Belfast and Jerusalem to contextualize Quetta's governance challenges. This multidisciplinary approach reveals how historical legacies and institutional failures perpetuate conflict and underdevelopment.

3.2.2 Policy and Institutional Reports

Legal milestones such as 18th constitutional amendment and Balochistan's local governance laws cover the policy insights alongside critical NGO analyses by International Crisis Group (2021) and Human Rights Watch (2022), profoundly, documenting systemic failures. This is added by the Transparency International's corruption assessments that further exposes institutional decay in the region by revealing how formal policies often crumble against ground realities.

3.2.3 Media and Archival Data

Media analysis are gathered from well-known media outlets such as Dawn, The Express Tribune, and BBC archives (2010-2023) by tracking Quetta's political evolution, while colonial administrative records further reveal how British-era settlements still shape contemporary governance, resulting in the formal institutional decay.

3.3 Data Analysis Framework

The given table explains step-wise analysis of the data with relevant examples.

Step	Procedure	Example Applicatio
1. Source Compilation	Gather secondary data from academic, policy, and media repositories.	Compile all ICG reports on Balochistan (2015–2023)
2. Thematic Coding	Identify recurring themes (ethnicity, militarization, corruption).	Code references to "military interference" in news articles.
3. Comparative Analysis	Contrast Quetta's leadership with global cases (Belfast, Kashmir).	Compare consociational models in Belfast vs. Quetta.
4. Critical Evaluation	Assess gaps between policy claims and ground realities.	Analyze discrepancies in federal vs. provincial budget allocations.

3.4 Ethical Considerations

Ethical consideration has been observed in this piece of work as the research prioritizes rigorous citation integrity in order to cover relevant secondary sources while practicing conflict-sensitive reporting by abstaining from sensationalized narratives regarding ethnic or military tensions. In fact, this study aims to academically contribute without compromising the scholarly ethics by keeping a balanced approach.

3.5 Justification for Secondary Data Approach

This study is built on secondary data which serves as many as three critical purposes: Firstly, it guarantees researcher safety by avoiding dangerous fieldwork in conflict zones. Secondly, it facilitates longitudinal analysis by uncovering decades-long leadership patterns that spot interviews couldn't capture. Lastly, it strengthens theoretical grounding by building on established frameworks such as post-colonialism, institutionalism.

4. Findings & Discussion

4.1 Political Leadership Structure in Quetta

Quetta's political leadership operates under a hybrid governance model which is a combination of both democratic and authoritarian elements at the same time. Tribal hierarchies and formal political party systems function under rigorous military oversight.

4.1.1 Party Politics and Ethnic Mobilization

Ayesha Jalal is of the opinion that colonial-era divisions are clearly visible through the dominance of ethnic-based parties (Jalal A., 1990). In fact, the case of Balochistan is more interesting as ethnic-based parties continue to dominate provincial politics. The Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), formed in 2018 as a pro-establishment coalition, is an evident how military-aligned elites manipulate ethnic identities so that they can maintain control (Ahmed M., 2020). Meanwhile, parties like the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) which advocates for Pashtun rights, frequently clashing with Baloch nationalist groups by perpetuating inter-ethnic tensions (Muhammad Ejaz, 2022). On the other hand, the National Party (NP), considered as a moderate political party by pushing for provincial autonomy within Pakistan's federal structure, ultimately reinforce ethnic divisions rather than transcending them (Siddiqi, 2019). According to Bieder, this fragmentation is also seen in other post-conflict societies such as Bosnia and Iraq, where ethnically structured political forces namely (SDA, SDS, KDP, PUK) have consistently undermined national cohesion by prioritizing narrow group interests over collective governance (Bieber, 2006).

4.1.2 Tribal Sardars and Parallel Governance

In Balochistan, traditional tribal sardars still wield immense influence, creating a parallel system of authority that often overshadows the state. Jirgas (tribal councils) handle nearly 80% of local disputes (Gazdar, 2004), sidelining Pakistan's formal judiciary, while feudal land ownership allows sardars to control economic resources and maintain their grip on power (Shah, 2019). This enduring dominance reflects what scholar Mahmood Mamdani (1996) calls "decentralized despotism", a colonial-era tactic of ruling through local elites that continues to shape governance long after independence. Rather than fading away, these tribal structures have adapted, ensuring that real authority remains in the hands of a few powerful families rather than democratic institutions.

4.1.3 Military-Civilian Dynamics

Pakistan's military continues to dominate politics in ways that stretch far beyond its constitutional role, effectively making it the nation's most powerful political actor. Through "soft coups", like the engineered rise of the Balochistan Awami Party in 2018, the establishment manipulates electoral outcomes without outright martial law (Siddiq, 2019). National security policies further reinforce this imbalance, prioritizing counterinsurgency and stability over meaningful democratic reform (Grare, 2019). This hybrid governance model, where generals pull strings behind civilian facades, finds eerie parallels in Myanmar's military-dominated system (Callahan, 2007). Whether through coercion, patronage, or institutional overreach, Pakistan's armed forces ensure that real decision-making rarely strays far from GHQ's grip, leaving democracy perpetually in a state of suspended animation.

4.2 Key Challenges to Effective Leadership

4.2.1 Ethnic Fragmentation

Quetta's politics remain paralyzed by deep ethnic divides, where Pashtun-Baloch rivalries routinely sabotage resource-sharing agreements (ICG, 2021). The violence extends beyond political gridlock, Hazara politicians risk assassination just for seeking representation (Akbar, 2021). Much like Northern Ireland's entrenched sectarianism during the Troubles, these divisions have become baked into institutions, making meaningful cooperation nearly impossible (McGarry, 2004). The result? A fractured society where communal loyalties consistently override collective progress.

4.2.2 Security Issues

Balochistan's instability is self-perpetuating. Militant groups like the BLA use violence to disrupt elections (Amnesty, 2022), while the military's heavy-handed response, arbitrary detentions and abusive

counterinsurgency tactics, only fuels resentment (HRW, 2023). Such cycles transform violence into a perverse norm, where bullets matter more than ballots (Kalyvas, 2006). The tragic irony? The very forces tasked with ensuring security often become the greatest obstacle to peace.

4.2.3 Institutional Weakness

In Balochistan, the state often exists in name only. A staggering 62% of schools are “ghost institutions”, funded but non-functional (World Bank, 2020), while courts take years to resolve even basic cases (PILDAT, 2022). Like the Democratic Republic of Congo’s hollow bureaucracy (Englebert, 2016), this creates a mirage of governance: laws exist on paper, but in practice, citizens are left to fend for themselves. The consequence? A population that sees the state as either absent or predatory, with little reason to trust in reform.

4.3 Impact on Democratic Governance

4.3.1 Elite Capture

Balochistan’s politics remain locked in the hands of a privileged few, nearly 70% of its MPs come from wealthy landowning dynasties (Wilder, 1999), while a shocking 88% of development funds vanish into elite pockets (Transparency Int’l, 2021). This isn’t just corruption; it’s a systemic stranglehold. Douglass North’s (North, 1990) theory of "limited access orders" perfectly captures how these powerful families deliberately stifle competition, ensuring only they benefit from power. The result? A province where opportunity is hoarded like family heirlooms.

4.3.2 Eroded Public Trust

Why vote if nothing changes? Balochistan’s record-low 38% election turnout (Gallup Pakistan, 2023) screams public despair. But apathy isn’t the only response, Hazara sit-ins and Baloch protest marches (Akbar, 2021) show raw anger at this broken contract between state and citizen. Like Lebanon’s 2019 uprising against sectarian thieves (Salamey, 2021), these movements reveal a painful truth: when institutions exist to serve only the powerful, people either check out or take to the streets. The real crisis isn’t just failing governance, it’s the death of belief that reform is even possible.

4.4 Synthesis: Quetta’s Leadership in Theoretical Perspective

Challenge	Local Manifestation	Global Equivalent	Theoretical Explanation
Ethnic Fragmentation	BAP vs. PkMAP deadlock	Bosnia’s tripartite presidency	Horowitz (1985) - Ethnic outbidding

Military Dominance	ISI’s kingmaker role	Myanmar’s Tatmadaw	Stepan (1988) - Military prerogatives
Institutional Decay	Ghost schools, judicial delays	DRC’s phantom state	North (1990) - Institutional failure

4.5 Policy Implications

Balochistan’s crises demand bold, proven solutions: demilitarizing politics (as Aceh did after its 2005 peace deal), cracking down on elite theft through Georgia-style asset disclosure laws, and rebuilding trust via inclusive power-sharing like Nepal’s ethnic federalism. These aren’t theoretical fixes; they’re blueprints that worked in societies just as fractured as Balochistan. The real question isn’t what to do, but whether Pakistan’s leaders will finally learn from others’ hard-won lessons.

5. Conclusion & Recommendations

5.1 Summary of Key Findings

Quetta’s political leadership struggles to function within a democratic system that’s been hollowed out by decades of structural problems. Colonial-era divisions have hardened into unbridgeable ethnic fault lines, with Pashtun, Baloch, and Hazara leaders trapped in the same destructive patterns seen in divided cities like Belfast, where identity politics constantly overrides shared interests (Bieber, 2006). Meanwhile, the military’s shadow governance, reminiscent of Myanmar’s generals or Egypt’s deep state (Siddiqi, 2019); (Stepan, 2020), ensures civilian leaders remain permanently on a short leash. Add to this the near-total collapse of local institutions, where basic governance has been replaced by elite predation—a scenario depressingly familiar from failed states like the DRC (Englebert, 2016).

What makes Quetta’s situation particularly dire is how these three crises reinforce each other. Ethnic fragmentation gives the military an excuse to intervene, military dominance weakens institutions, and institutional failure pushes people back into ethnic silos. It’s a vicious cycle that feels designed to resist change, yet similar patterns have been broken elsewhere. The question isn’t whether solutions exist (Aceh’s demilitarization, Nepal’s power-sharing models, and Georgia’s anti-corruption drives all show pathways), but whether Pakistan’s power brokers will ever allow real reform. Until then, Quetta’s leaders will keep trying to govern with both hands tied behind their backs, by history, by the generals, and by the very systems meant to empower them.

5.2 Recommendations for Democratic Strengthening

5.2.1 Enhancing Institutional Reforms

The government should speed up institutional reforms, creating a more equitable and inclusive society by actively countering elite dominance. One powerful approach, in this regard, is decentralizing fiscal authority, inspired by Kerala's participatory budgeting model where local communities directly decide how 40% of public funds are spent, this not only democratizes decision-making but fosters grassroots ownership. At the same time, justice systems also need revitalization through specialized anti-corruption courts such as that of Indonesia's effective KPK framework, where accountability and public trust are ensured effectively. Additionally, empowering local governments by mandating 33% women's representation in councils in line with Rwanda's transformative policies, by reshaping governance to better reflect community needs. Supporting evidence from the World Bank highlights that decentralized systems reduce corruption by 22%, proving that when power is shared and institutions are inclusive, societies thrive with greater transparency and equity.

5.2.2 Promoting Inclusive Leadership

True leadership isn't about control, it's about connection, courage, and bringing people together even when differences run deep. Imagine a place like Quetta, where historic divides linger, leaders took inspiration from Bosnia's Dayton Accords, which forced former enemies to share power and rebuild trust (Burg, 2015). Similarly, consider the bold voices of Tunisia's youth, who, after the revolution, carved out spaces like youth parliaments to reshape politics with hope and fresh ideas (Mansouri, 2022). Change doesn't just happen at the top, it grows from the ground up, like Nigeria's interfaith peace committees in Plateau State, where neighbors once torn apart by violence now sit together, turning suspicion into solidarity (Akinwale, 2011). Real leaders don't just give orders; they listen, they lift others up, and, especially in crises, they lead by example, proving that trust and humility can heal even the deepest wounds. Because in the end, leadership isn't about who holds power, it's about who makes others feel powerful.

5.2.3 Improving Security Governance

The global success stories are significant to learn about having balanced and systematic civil-military relationships built on improved accountability mechanism. In this regard, the South Africa's Parliamentary Defense Committee model is an example that demonstrates how to keep military authority in check by having robust legislative oversight. Meanwhile, the Colombian Cuadrantes program has beautifully transformed

the security forces by applying community-based approaches that resulted in building mutual trust between the citizens and the police force. In fact, cooperation rather than repression is the ultimate solution for long term peace in conflict hit regions. These reforms aren't just theoretical, Indonesia's 2004 restructuring dramatically rolled back military involvement in business by 70%, proving that with political will, even deeply entrenched systems can change for the better.

5.3 Implementation Roadmap

The following is a complete road map of implementation policy in the given table.

Policy Area	Short-Term (1–3 years)	Medium-Term (3–5 years)	Long-Term (5+ years)
Institutional	Audit local councils (PILDAT oversight)	Judicial automation (e-courts)	Constitutional devolution (18th Amendment II)
Inclusivity	Youth town halls (UNDP-backed)	Ethnic quota laws (Balochistan Assembly)	Unified secular curriculum
Security	Parliamentary defense reviews	ISI budget transparency laws	Military business divestment

5.4 Theoretical Contributions

This research has contributed remarkably in several pivotal areas, speaking of the phenomenon of governance, the development of a framework for a post-colonial institutionalism which argues the relationship and influence of historical power structure on modern politics is something pretty exceptional. Similarly, through evidence, the research highlights unbridled tribal governance that can undermine democratic institutions. At the same time, practical solutions are suggested from the global south conflict zones which could be adopted successfully.

While Quetta's challenges are undeniably complex, lessons from around the world show that meaningful progress is possible. The EU's approach in the Balkans demonstrates how targeted international pressure, linking aid to governance reforms, can push reluctant elites toward accountability. Armenia's 2018 revolution proves that grassroots movements can successfully challenge corrupt systems when citizens unite. Even South Africa's negotiated transition reminds us that seemingly impossible transformations can occur when opposing factions find common interest in stability. While each context differs, these cases collectively show that progress emerges through multiple pathways, top-

down pressure, bottom-up mobilization, or elite realignment, if the political will exists.

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